Abstract: This paper updates our earlier work (Ahearne, Fernald, Loungani and Schindler, 2003) on whether China, with its huge pool of labor and an allegedly undervalued exchange rate, is hurting the export performance of other emerging market economies in Asia. We continue to find that while exchange rates matter for export performance, the income growth of trading partners matters far more. This suggests the potential for exports of all Asian economies to grow in harmony as long as global growth is strong. We also examine changes in export shares of Asian economies to the U.S. market and find evidence that dramatic changes in shares are taking place. Many of these changes are consistent with a 'flying geese' pattern in which China moves into the product space vacated by the Asian NIEs or with greater integration of trade across Asia in the production of final goods. Nevertheless, China's dramatic gains in recent years do increase the pressure on Asian economies, particularly in ASEAN and South Asia, to seek areas of comparative advantage.
1.

Introduction
Discussions of trade linkages among the emerging markets of Asia often include polar views. Under one view, China and other Asian economies can grow in harmony, as exemplified in the 'flying geese' paradigm [Akamatsu (1961 [Akamatsu ( , 1962 ].
1 Okita (1985) noted that the great diversity among the Asian nations in their stages of development and resource endowments "works to facilitate the flying geese pattern of shared development as each is able to take advantage of its distinctiveness to develop with a supportive division of labor." Some recent
analyses [e.g. Kwan (2002) ] also take the view that economies in Asia share mutual benefits from the potential of greater integration of product lines across the region and the increased incomes of Chinese consumers, both of which are reflected in expanding intra-regional trade in
Asia [see also Zebregs (2004) ].
The other view sees China and other Asian economies largely as competitors: They specialize in the production of export goods that are relatively close substitutes and compete for "… owing to the emergence of China in East Asia, there has been some disruption in the conventional orderly catch-up process of the flying-geese pattern led by Japan, followed by the NIEs, ASEAN members, and China. It argues that, through receiving direct foreign investment, China has been gaining competitiveness not only in labor-intensive products, but also IT and other technology-intensive products. As a result, the complementary international division of labor according to the level of economic development has given way to stiffer competition, including in high-tech industries. In the long-term, such increased competition could bring overall benefits to the regional economy by improving productivity. In the short-term, however, increasing competition between China and ASEAN members could have negative repercussions on the latter, as illustrated by the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis." [quoted in Kwan (2002)] In one provocative but popular rendition of this view, Asian economies are 'sitting ducks' being picked off by a China armed with a huge pool of cheap labor and an allegedly undervalued 1 See also Diwan and Hoekman (1999) , Kojima (2000) and Loungani (2000) .
exchange rate (Bhalla (1998) ). Calls for an appreciation of the renminbi are a staple in policy circles (see Bergsten (2006) for a recent example).
The evidence in this paper suggests that the polar views do not do justice to the rapidly evolving trade relationships among Asian economies. 2 In Section 2, we present evidence that at the aggregate level, Chinese export growth and that of other Asian economies move in tandem,
suggesting that both depend on common shocks. We verify this evidence on the relative importance of foreign income and exchange rates in the determination of Asian export growth using a three-variable VAR model. An important finding is that, while exchange rates do matter for export performance, the income growth of trading partners matters even more. In this sense, China and emerging Asia are on the same side, with the export performance of both still heavily dependent on income growth in common major trading partners, viz., the United States, the European Union and Japan.
Turning from the aggregate to sectoral data, we find, nevertheless, that there is clearly considerable shifting of trade patterns taking place. In Section 3, we present evidence from industry-level data on the extent of export competition between China and other Asian economies in the U.S. market, where competition is likely to have been most intense. We find that China has gained market share in the U.S. market as a whole and in almost every industry, while the share of other Asian economies has declined. However, many other Asian economies, particularly the ASEAN-4 economies, have also experienced gains in market shares in a number of industries at the expense of the Asian NIEs. In many industries, therefore, the results are suggestive of a 'flying geese' pattern in which China and the ASEAN-4 move into the product space vacated by the NIEs. In addition, as China continues its rapid development, other economies in the region have an incentive to try to move up the value chain as their comparative advantage shifts to higher-value added, less labor intensive industries. We also summarize the evidence on the beneficial effects of China's growth on the rest of Asia through the channel of rising Chinese imports from the rest of Asia.
That said, the other view is also right in claiming that China's increased integration into the global economy has meant that sectoral transitions in other Asian economies are likely occurring at a faster pace than would otherwise have been the case. Asian economies therefore need to take steps to ease the transition of their labor force into other sectors, including through the provision of social safety nets to lower the costs of adjustment. Figure 1 shows the striking comovement between China's export growth and that of other
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Asian economies. The figure shows export growth (measured in dollar values) to the world from China (including Hong Kong SAR) 3 and from the 'rest of Asia' 4 , using trading partner statistics.
The co-movement in export growth between China and other Asian economies suggests that common factors-such as growth in advanced economies, movements in the world prices of key exports such as semiconductors, and movements in the yen-dollar rate-were probably more important determinants of Asian exports than was competition with China.
In addition, the vertical integration of many product markets in Asia would likely add to this similarity in growth rates. As an example of how vertical integration might make export growth rates similar, take the example of a small electronic device like a DVD player. The manufacturing of some components-e.g., motherboards, memory, etc.-might be handled in one or several of the ASEAN economies or the NIEs. Those components are then exported to, say, China, where they are assembled into the DVD player. The DVD player is then shipped out to its final destination. Several economies in the region might thus provide value-added to a single device. Hence, as demand for DVD players fluctuates, one would expect export growth to be positively correlated across economies.
Discussions of China's export performance tend to emphasize factors peculiar to China, such as economic reform initiatives, rapid investment, tax incentives, or its WTO accession.
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Some observers focus almost solely on the perceived undervaluation of the renminbi exchange rate to explain China's export performance. There have been, of course, times when Chinaspecific factors have had a large impact on China's exports (e.g., China's WTO accession almost certainly had a larger effect on China than on its trading partners/competitors). However, these discussions tend to miss the prevalence of common shocks, which Figure 1 suggest are of equal or greater importance. Table 1 and 2 provide some further evidence on the comovement by controlling for the obvious common factors: Growth in industrial country GDP and real exchange rates. (For example, for much of the period emerging Asia pegged implicitly or explicitly to the dollar, so that changes in the yen/dollar rate would be a common shock for these economies.) In particular,
we show results from fixed-effects panel regressions of the real volume of non-China Asian export growth on Chinese real export growth as well as control variables. For these purposes, we include Hong Kong in the NIEs, rather than with China.
5 Chinese export growth has also been helped by structural reforms of the exchange and trade system, as detailed in Cerra and Dayal-Gulati (1999) . Examples include allowing local governments and exporting enterprises to retain a proportion of foreign exchange receipts, eliminating mandatory export and import planning, and opening up the economy to foreign direct investment. Despite occasional reversals, the overall trend has been to reduce the role of central planning in China's foreign trade.
The first three columns of Table 1 do not include controls other than fixed effects and an (insignificant) lagged dependent variable. These columns show the main implication of Figure 1 that when China's exports rise, exports of other economies also tend to rise.
The next three columns include controls. We measure foreign GDP as a weighted average of export-partner GDP, where the weights are country-specific export weights. The real effective exchange rate for each economy uses trade weights with major trading partners, and corresponds to the methodology used by staff at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in calculating their published U.S. real exchange rate indices (see Loretan (2005) for details).
We note that in the case of China's exchange rate, we do not use the "official" exchange rate between 1987 and 1994. For that period, China had a dual exchange rate system with an official rate and a parallel floating rate (the so-called swap market rate). Following Fernald, Edison, and Loungani (1999) , we use a trade-weighted average of the official and swap rates for this period. This correction substantially changes China's real exchange rate around the 1994 unification of the two rates, but does not qualitatively change the results that follow.
Even with the foreign-GDP and real-exchange-rate controls, the conditional correlation remains positive: When China's exports rise, other economies' exports also tend to rise. This is true even when we allow lags of the explanatory variables in the last three columns. We then run a panel vector autoregression (VAR) with three variables: (1) real income growth among major trading partners, (2) real exchange rate growth, and (3) real export growth.
In estimating the VAR, we order the variables as listed; other orderings of the variables have little effect on results. We include two lags of each variable in the estimation, along with country fixed effects. The most interesting impulse responses are reproduced in Figure 3 , which shows only the point estimates going out four years after the shock. An increase in income growth among trading partners leads to an increase in a "representative" Asian economy's export growth: there is a strong--and statistically significant--contemporaneous impact. Over the next few years, the impact dissipates and is not statistically significantly different from zero. A depreciation in the currencies of major trading partners has the predicted adverse impact on export growth in the representative economy. Here, too, it is only the contemporaneous impact that is significantly different from zero. Figure 2 ) and also account for the largest share of the variance.
These results suggest that, over the last twenty five years, changes in real exchange rates have not been the primary determinant of export growth for the major Asian exporters. A more important determinant has been income growth in the major trading partners (which, over the bulk of our sample period, reflects growth in the industrialized economies, particularly the United States). Industrial country demand and the effects of structural changes are likely to have outweighed exchange rate fluctuations as determinants of China's export growth.
These findings can explain why, for instance, China's export growth remained strong during the Asian crisis in 1997-98. Overall demand remained high (with strength in the United
States and Europe countering weakness among Asian trading partners). As a result, export growth remained quite robust despite the drag from the depreciations of many Asian currencies.
Prasad and Rumbaugh (2003) make a similar point about the more recent period. While acknowledging that "the recent depreciation of the U.S. dollar, to which the renminbi is linked, has no doubt added temporarily to China's competitiveness," they suggest that it is unlikely that exchange rates are the primary determinant of China export growth because "China's exports continued to grow rapidly virtually across the board even when the U.S. dollar was appreciating against other major currencies."
Sectoral Evidence on Export Competition Among Asian Economies in the U.S. Market
This section describes how the market shares of exports of the various Asian economies have changed over time. We focus on exports to the United States, which is likely to have been the market where competition has been most intense. In addition to looking at changes in the overall market share (i.e. exports across all industries combined), we present evidence on changes in two high-profile industries that were identified in our previous work as being ones that displayed large changes in trade shares and accounted for a sizable fraction of total U.S.
imports from these Asian economies.
By focusing on relative export performance in a single geographic region and for specific industries, we hope to obtain product-level evidence on "export competition." For these purposes, we define export competition as "shifts in market share" across four groups of Asian economies, China, the Asian NIEs, ASEAN-4, and a South Asia bloc (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan). In particular, we want to see if China's market share has increased markedly within a particular industry.
Note that by focusing on shares in particular markets we are strongly stacking the deck in favor of the export-competition view. After all, since shares sum to 100 percent, it is arithmetically impossible for all shares to move in the same direction. So a country may have its share in a particular market decline without necessarily experiencing a decline in the level of its exports to that market. It may be losing market share in one market but gaining it in another.
Moreover, some changes in shares may be deliberate, as in the case of industries that have shifted to a more vertically integrated approach to manufacturing.
Nevertheless, the changing shares give some sense of how trade patterns are evolving in the various economies. Also, from the perspective of a producer within a narrow industry, these figures give some sense of who they are competing against. Thus, the changing trade patterns discussed here provide indirect evidence on whether China and emerging Asia bettter fit the "flying geese" or "sitting ducks" paradigm. industries that make up the aggregate. 6 The tables contain a huge amount of data but some salient features emerge.
First, looking at Table 4 , there is no doubt that China has emerged as a significant exporter across virtually the entire spectrum of industries: its share has increased in 41 industries.
In contrast, there are only four industries in which the NIE share is higher in 2005 than in 1989 and these are all in the industrial supplies and materials category (1-digit code '1', i.e., 3-digit codes that begin with a '1'). In addition, there is one industry, 300 (new and used passenger cars), in which the NIEs have nearly maintained a 100 percent share of U.S. imports from emerging Asia since 1989, although with foreign direct investment in China's auto sector growing rapidly it may not be too long before that dominance is challenged as well.
Second, increases in the shares of ASEAN-4 are also quite prevalent, increasing in 17 of the 47 industries. This means that cases in which the shares of both China and ASEAN-4 have increased are almost as likely as cases in which their shares have moved in the opposite direction.
Third, an interesting finding is that South Asia shows an increase in 30 of the 47 industries. Though this region's overall share of the U.S. market still remains small, the increases at the sectoral level suggest that that the region may start to be a contender in future.
Overall, the message from Table 4 is that China and ASEAN-4 appear to have been moving into the product space vacated by the NIEs. The evidence is only reinforced if one takes into account the amount of imports from Asia in each industry, which is shown in Table 5 We now turn to a closer look at the changes over time in trade shares. Table 6 .A. shows export shares for the four groups for the U.S. market as a whole. As shown, in 1989 China and Hong Kong together accounted for about a quarter of total exports to the United States from the four groups. By 1993, China's share had increased to a third. Mainland China alone nearly doubled its share of the U.S. market, helped perhaps by the real depreciation of the renminbi over this period. The ASEAN-4 group also increased its market share, but by a smaller magnitude than the increase in mainland China's share. Correspondingly, the share of the NIEs fell from 56 percent to 42 percent. There is, therefore, some evidence of "competition"-shifts in market share-among these three groups over the period 1989 to 1993. South Asia's share did not change over this period.
By contrast to the 1989-93 period, the period between 1993 and 1997 is far more tranquil. Asia has held its own over this period.
In sum, contrary to some popular perceptions, China's gains in market share have not come about primarily at the expense of the labor-intensive ASEAN-4 or South Asian economies.
Instead, China displaced the NIEs in industries that these more advanced economies were relinquishing. This is a healthy development. It mimics an earlier period, when the NIEs moved into the industries relinquished by a more advanced Japan. In the most recent period, however, from 2001 to 2005, we do see that China's share has risen considerably, still primarily at the expense of the NIEs, but also at the expense of the ASEAN-4.
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The Destination of Asian NIE Exports
An interesting fact that emerges from the data is that the NIEs are losing import shares in the U.S. market in almost all categories of goods at the same time that their overall exports are growing. This raises an obvious question: "Where are exports from the NIEs going?" In Table 7 , we attempt to answer this using data from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). 8 The table shows the average annual growth rate of exports from China, the NIEs, the ASEAN-4 and 7 For more on the impact of China on ASEAN-4 see Gochoco-Bautista (1995) and Tambunan (2006) .
South Asia (as we have defined them in this paper) to the world, the G-3 (United States, Japan, and European Union, which we use as a proxy for industrial economies), China, the NIEs, the ASEAN-4 and South Asia. In the early period, it is obvious that China's share of the G-3 import market was growing at the expense of the NIEs. The average growth in Chinese exports to the G-3 was almost 20 percent during that period, while NIE export growth to the G-3 was just 2 percent. However, NIE exports to China were growing at almost a 30 percent annual rate at that time. In the stable share period from 1993-2001, the export growth rates of all three groups were fairly similar. The NIEs experienced a more rapid period of export growth to the G-3, perhaps due to the U.S. high-tech boom, and the NIEs exports to China continued to rise, albeit at a slower rate.
In the period 2001 to 2005, however, the differences are striking. In this period, both the NIEs and ASEAN-4 have experienced export growth to China at a rate that far outstrips their export growth to other regions. 10 We offer two explanations for the rise in NIE exports to China and the relative weakness of exports to the G-3. First, demand in China remained strong throughout the period we examined, despite several episodes of global weakness. Most noticeably, during the 2000-2002 period, the U.S. high-tech bubble burst, global demand fell, 9 So, for example, exports from the ASEAN-4 to the ASEAN-4 represent total exports from each of the ASEAN-4 economies to the other three economies in the ASEAN-4-in essence, an intra-subregional trade measure. Similarly, exports from China to China capture mainland China's exports to Hong Kong and Hong Kong's exports to the mainland. and yet China continued to grow at a robust pace. Thus, it is not surprising that exports to China rose significantly in that period. Second, the shifting of production facilities to China from the NIEs likely has boosted NIE exports of intermediate products to China for processing and export of the finished product. 11 The data presented here do not shed light on the relative importance of these two explanations, but it is likely that both are partly responsible.
Conclusions
We have When one looks at the sectoral data on U.S. imports from Asia, there is no doubt that China is displacing other Asian economies across a wide spectrum of markets. Not all of this displacement is symptomatic of competition. First, a significant portion of the final assembly of Asian-made products takes place in China. In that sense, as McKinnon and Schnab (2006) state, "China is merely the face of a worldwide export surge into American consumer markets".
11 For a detailed discussion of the rise in intraregional trade in Asia, see Zebregs (2003) . He concludes that "the rise in intraregional trade is largely driven by rapidly growing intra-industry trade, which is a reflection of greater vertical specialization and the dispersion of production processes across borders. This has led to a sharp rise in trade in intermediate goods ... but the EU, Japan and the United States remain the main export markets for final goods."
Second, to some extent the changes in trade shares reflect a longer-term trend of China moving into the product space vacated by the Asian NIEs as they move to higher value-added products.
Nevertheless, it seems likely that the shifts in trade shares require actual shifts in resource allocations, which can often be painful for those who lose out. The appropriate policy response would be to take steps to smooth the flow of resources across sectors. 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5
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